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BOOK REVIEW:
OVERDOSE:
HOW EXCESSIVE GOVERNMENT REGULATION
STIFLES PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION
Authored By: Richard A. Epstein*
Overdose offers a comprehensive examination of the pharmaceutical
industry by following the course of a new drug as it progresses from
early development to final delivery. Richard A. Epstein looks closely at
the regulatory framework that surrounds creating pharmaceutical
products, and Epstein assesses which current legal and regulatory
practices work and which ones have gone awry. In Overdose Epstein
cautions that more stringent controls over every aspect of drug
development and approval will stifle pharmaceutical innovation and
slow delivery of beneficial treatments to patients who need them.
Epstein considers the numerous challenges that face the industry and
argues that to ensure continuing creativity, efficiency and success of the
pharmaceutical industry, the best system will feature strong property
rights and clear enforceable contracts with minimal regulatory or
judicial interference.
Reviewed By: John E. Calfee, Ph.D**
Written by a prolific and accomplished legal scholar, Richard Epstein's
Overdose evolved from a collection of occasional writings into a
monograph. It retains the characteristics of a hastily written product of
a careful and adventurous thinker who happens to compose fluid,
sometimes colorful, prose. The book is full of insights. It gives
disproportionate emphasis to topics the author knows well (such as
intellectual property and products liability law) with scant mention of
ones he has had no occasion to visit (the design and regulation of
clinical trials, and the nuts and bolts of price controls, to name two
essential topics). The subtitle for the book's tendentious title is a bit
misleading. Roughly half the book passes before Epstein reaches the
topics that most people associate with pharmaceutical industry
regulation: price controls and especially, the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA). However, Epstein sees all of his main topics,
starting with intellectual property and ending with tort liability
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litigation, as describing a series of "regulatory hurdles" that useful
pharmaceuticals must surmount.
Epstein is a classical liberal whose formidable analytical skills
are often harnessed to the cause of minimal government intervention
(Simple Rules for a Complex World, Skepticism and Freedom. A
Modern Case for Classical Liberalism). Many of his arguments are
highly nuanced rather than doctrinaire and, especially on intellectual
property, are less predictable than one might expect. What we get is a
very practical form of libertarianism arguing that concrete results
confirm the validity of basic principles. Virtually the entire work is
suffused with economic reasoning although careful parsing of the law
(on deceptive marketing, for example) sometimes leaves economics in
the background. Much of this reasoning starts with the most
fundamental economic characteristic of the pharmaceutical market,
which is the huge gap between prices and marginal costs.
The result is a work to be reckoned with. Anti-pharmaceutical-
industry books published in the past few years have been common and
there is no let-up in sight.1 Epstein's monograph is a rare example of
an opposing point of view. He tackles nearly every major argument
raised in this increasingly crowded field of conflict. He also addresses
topics that have yet to capture public attention but may do so, such as
proposals for government buyouts of patents and overt government
competition with private industry to bring new drugs to market.
I. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
Overdose begins with property law, but with Roman property law
rather than intellectual property law as one might expect. Epstein
emphasizes that patents and other forms of intellectual property are
* Richard A. Epstein is a James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law,
Faculty Director for Curriculum, and Director, Law and Economics program at the
University of Chicago School of Law. Mr. Epstein has also served as the Peter and
Kirstin Bedford Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution since 2000.
**John E. Calfee, Ph.D., is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute for
Public Policy Research.
Leading examples include MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE DRUG
COMPANIES: How THEY DECEIVE US AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT (Random House
2004); JERRY AVORN, POWERFUL MEDICINES: THE BENEFITS, RISKS, AND COSTS OF
PRESCRIPTION DRUGS (Knopf 2004); PHILIP J. HILTS, PROTECTING AMERICA'S
HEALTH: THE FDA, BUSINESS, AND ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF REGULATION (Univ. of
N. Carolina Press 2004); JEROME KASSIRER, ON THE TAKE: How MEDICINE'S
COMPLICITY WITH BIG BUSINESS CAN ENDANGER YOUR HEALTH (Oxford University
Press 2004).
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relatively recent legal inventions. A lawyer-economist to the core, he
explains why intellectual property rights made little economic sense in
earlier eras. Then he proceeds to explain why patents, in particular, are
essential to drug development, an industry barely a century old.
Throughout, economic incentives are at the core of the evolution of I.P.
law, which Epstein believes proceeded in a largely logical and
beneficial fashion. The entire discussion is enlightening, with an
emphasis on gradualism (starting, of course, with the default situation
of no I.P. whatsoever) and learn-by-doing as patent protection
expanded to encompass forms of life, snippets of DNA, and biological
mechanisms that serve as drug targets. He explains why a "thicket" of
biology-based patents could create an "anticommons" that would
inhibit progress built on the accumulation of knowledge, and then cites
evidence that, at least so far, there is little to worry about in this respect.
An especially difficult topic is research tools, where various sectors of
pharmaceutical and other high-tech industries disagree among
themselves regarding the appropriate rules for commercial use. In
Duke Univ. v. Madey,2 the Supreme Court seems to have struck a
reasonable balance, at least for the time being, between fair use of
research tools in purely academic research versus commercially-
oriented research conducted by academic institutions such as
universities.
That Epstein sees patents as the essential source of new drug
development is no surprise. But he is suspicious of broad patents, a
point on which, again, the pharmaceutical industry is often split. He
emphasizes the diverse interests that competitors have in the substance
and scope of what is permitted in granting patents. For him, the default
option is to make patents as narrow as possible. He is also surprisingly
cool toward the 1980 Bayh-Dole Act, 3 which permits recipients of
National Institutes of Health (NIH) research support to patent what they
discover. On this tricky issue, Epstein's analysis is a model of
economic reasoning, starting with first principles and reaching
intriguing implications for contemporary issues.
Epstein then offers a superb analysis of two proposals that have
received relatively little attention but will almost certainly receive more
as the political debate over the pharmaceutical industry continues to
mount. Chapter Nine looks at proposals for government buyouts of
pharmaceutical patents. Such proposals arise from the wide disparity
between prices and marginal costs and the social costs of such
2 Duke Univ. v. Madey, 539 U.S. 958 (2003).
3 Bayh-Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (1980).
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arrangements, namely, the inability to attain prices that are efficient
both from the standpoint of distribution (where marginal-cost pricing
would allow usage by everyone who finds the benefits exceed costs)
and research incentives (where the expectation of supra-marginal-cost
pricing is essential to motivate investment). Epstein explains the
common observation that firms already have incentives to discriminate
among users to charge lower prices where willingness to pay is
relatively small, while acknowledging the natural limits to price
discrimination in a market where arbitrage is hard to stop. Epstein also
adds interesting and subtle arguments to the effect that government
buyouts are simply not practical. They would run aground on the
bewildering variety of pricing and risk-taking problems that
competitive markets solve in an equally bewildering mix of market
transactions.
Chapter Ten is on the "Socialization" of drug development, by
which he means proposals to encourage government agencies, most
prominently the (NIH), to enter the drug development market in
competition with private firms. Epstein argues that government
agencies have no mechanism for solving the intricate problems of
investing in high-stakes, high-risk research. Again, the arguments are
remarkably subtle and compelling for someone with limited formal
training in economics.
One point Epstein does not touch upon is what we can learn
from the fact that substantial areas of drug development already exist
where private market incentives are known to be weak or absent.
These extend well beyond the much despaired failure to develop new
treatments and preventatives for tuberculosis, malaria, and other
tropical diseases, to such rich-nation plagues as drug-resistant
antibiotics and the failure to research new uses of off-patent drugs. The
eclipse of research incentives with patent expiration is obvious and
explains the lack of industry research on, for example, unlabeled uses
for Neurontin, an epilepsy drug whose greatest value probably lies in
treating neuropathic pain.4 Antibiotics are different. The specter of
drug resistance causes physicians, for the best possible reasons, to use a
newly approved antibiotic as little as possible in order to keep it in
reserve for when older drugs encounter widespread resistance. The
result is limited sales during the years before patent expiration. The
adverse impact on incentives to develop new classes of antibiotics
' Robert H. Dworkin, et al. Advances in Neuropathic Pain: Diagnosis, Mechanisms,
and Treatment Recommendations, 60 ARCHIVES OF NEUROLOGY 1524, 1524-34
(2003).
[Vol. 10.4:513
OVERDOSE
(which are notoriously difficult to create anyway) have been much
discussed . Nonetheless, NIH has failed to step in. We still rely upon
the private sector for the very few innovative antibiotics that do get
developed. This peculiar dynamic reinforces Epstein's arguments
about the futility of relying upon publicly supported drug development
in place of private sector research.
Epstein does not address one point, which in fact is relatively
unexplored despite its importance. The relationship between basic
research and successful branded pharmaceuticals is far from a one-
sided one in which industry realizes gains from publicly supported
research. Many of the top-selling drugs actually contribute to basic
research by serving as tools for rejecting otherwise unresolved
hypotheses that in some cases are quite fundamental. An example is
how clinical trial results from the increasing potent statin class of
cholesterol-reducing drugs has transformed understanding of both the
role of low-density lipoprotein cholesterol (LDL cholesterol) in
cardiovascular disease and the cause of heart attacks.6
II. PRICES AND PRICE CONTROLS
All advanced nations except the United States control patented drug
prices through legislation. Proposals to do so in the U.S. are common,
including "reimportation" (actually, just importation, since most of the
drugs are not manufactured in the U.S.) from foreign nations at
controlled prices, forcing firms to sell in the U.S. at prices they charge
elsewhere, and expanding the ambit of price controls where they exist
in the U.S., such as at the Veterans Administration. Epstein's analyses
of price controls start with patents and their chief effect, monopoly
pricing at levels far above manufacturing costs. His detailed analysis
of recent proposals is somewhat dated in the rapidly changing political
environment, but the basic arguments are still quite sound. He is
particularly sharp on Constitutional arguments, drawing on his work on
the takings clause.7 The essential point, however, is that price controls
5 Allison E. Aiello, Nicholas B. King, and B. Foxman, Ethical Conflicts in Public
Health Research and Practice; Antimicrobial Resistance and the Ethics of Drug
Development, 96 AM. J. PUBLIC HEALTH 1910, 1910-14 (2006).
6 Eric Topol, Intensive Statin Therapy: A Sea Change in Cardiovascular Prevention,
350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1562, 1562-64 (2004); Daniel Steinberg, An Interpretive
History of the Cholesterol Controversy, Part V. The discovery of the statins and the
end of the controversy, 47 JOURNAL OF LIPID RESEARCH 1339, 1339-51 (2006).
7 RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN (Harvard Univ. Press 1985).
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are bound to undermine research incentives, and he cites recent
economic estimates of the effects of pushing U.S. prices down to
European levels.
Epstein has almost nothing to say about how foreign price
controls actually work, which is understandable given the diversity of
those mechanisms. He also does not mention the remarkable fact that
foreign price controls are largely ineffective against sole-source
biotechnology drugs such as targeted drugs for cancer and rheumatoid
arthritis.
8
III. FDA REGULATION
FDA regulation of pharmaceuticals is a much-analyzed topic to which
Epstein has less to add than to other matters addressed in this book.
His starting point is the familiar disparity between the excessive weight
given by FDA staff to Type I errors (the approval of a new drug that
turns out badly) compared to Type II errors (failing to approve a useful
drug). The disparity in weights arises from external forces. Type I
errors become public, whereas Type II errors are observed mainly by
insiders. Epstein agrees with many economists that the FDA operates
with excessive caution, giving far too much weight to safety when
reviewing new drugs and therefore delaying or preventing valuable
drugs from reaching desperately sick patients. His solution is not
reform, but privatization. Citing Henry Miller, he recommends that the
drug approval system should be changed along the lines of medical
device approvals in the European Union, where private "notified
bodies" compete to review and approve new and altered medical
devices. 9 Chai provides fascinating details about the very different
European and American systems for medical device regulation. 10
An essential factor in recent FDA behavior is only alluded to by
Epstein. Ever since Merck withdrew its pain reliever Vioxx in
September 2004 because of cardiovascular risks, the FDA has endured
years of truly vitriolic criticism from leading medical journals,
8 John E. Calfee & Elizabeth DuPr6, The Emerging Market Dynamics of Targeted
Therapeutics, 25 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1302, 1302-08 (2006).
9 HENRY I. MILLER, To AMERICA'S HEALTH: A PROPOSAL TO REFORM THE FOOD AND
DRUG ADMINISTRATION
(Hoover Institution Press 2000).
'0 John Y. Chai, Medical Device Regulation in the United States and the European
Union: a Comparative Study, 55 FOOD DRUG L. J. 57, 57-80 (2000).
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Congress, and the news media."' On the whole, the FDA's performance
in the Vioxx affair has been sound.12 This is clear from, among other
things, the recommendations of American and Canadian expert panels
to keep Celebrex, the drug most similar to Vioxx, on the market and
even to bring Vioxx back,' 3 plus the fact that advanced nations with
regulatory apparatus comparable to the FDA have not only kept
Celebrex on the market but have approved Arcoxia, a drug similar to
Vioxx that was also developed by Merck.14 Nonetheless, the criticism
has been unrelenting, reinforced by a highly critical Institute of
Medicine (IOM) report on FDA oversight of drug safety. 15 In historical
terms, however, this is merely an especially vivid example of the forces
that cause the FDA to be excessively cautious in approving new drugs.
The impact of the Vioxx episode and its aftermath became very clear in
April 2007 when an FDA advisory committee, prodded by the FDA
itself, voted twenty to one against approving a new member of the Cox-
2-inhibitor class (of which Vioxx was one) on the grounds that proof
that the it was as safe and effective as the drugs against which it would
compete was insufficient reason to permit the drug on the market.'
6
IV. MARKETING
Epstein's discussion of pharmaceutical marketing is among his most
forcefully argued sections and is likely to arouse strong dissent from
the industry's critics. The starting point, again, is the yawning gap
between prices and marginal costs. The implication is that once a drug
has traversed the approval process and is available for use, the task of
" E.g., Richard Horton, Vioxx, the Implosion of Merck, and Aftershocks at the FDA,
364 THE LANCET 1995, 1996 (2004); Eric J. Topol, Failing the Public Health.
Rofecoxib, Merck, and the FDA, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1707, 1707-09 (2004).
12 John E. Calfee, The Vioxx Fallout, AEI HEALTH POLICY OUTLOOK (Sept.- Oct.
2005).
13 Susan Okie, Raising the Safety Bar: the FDA's Coxib Meeting, 352 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1283, 1283-85 (2005); Health Canada, Report of the expert advisory panel on
the safety of Cox-2 selective NSAIDs, July 8, 2005, available at http://www.hc-
sc.gc.ca/dhp-mps/prodpharma/activit/sci-
consult/cox2/sapreport-gcs-rapport cox2_e.html (last visited April 24, 2007); the
latter is cited by Epstein.
14 Calfee, supra note 12; Anna Wilde Mathews, FDA Panel's Vote Against Arcoxia
Gives Merck New Headache in Painkiller Class, WALL STREET JOURNAL, Apr. 13,
2007, at A3.
15 Institute of Medicine, The Future of Drug Safety: Promoting and Protecting the
Health of the Public (National Academy of Sciences 2006).
16 Mathews, supra note 14.
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getting that drug to the right users is fraught with difficulty but also
with large payoffs in terms of both profits and health. Essentially,
Epstein makes several arguments. One is that marketing is,
paradoxically, the source of reasonable pricing. Good marketing will
increase sales, perhaps dramatically, thus spreading development costs
(which in the long run will determine prices) across more customers at
lower individual prices. Marketing is also essential to patient welfare,
partly by getting new drugs to the patients who would benefit the most.
Finally, because it increases expected payoffs from innovative new
drug development, marketing bolsters R&D investment.
This is largely a conceptual treatment, however, supplemented
by tedious (for the non-lawyer, at least) explication of deceptive
advertising law. Epstein only glances at the extensive and compelling
medical literature on under-diagnosis and under-treatment of conditions
amenable to drug treatment. Although he does not mention it, there is
also a burgeoning literature employing survey and econometric
methods to assess direct-to-consumer advertising of prescription drugs.
That literature provides considerable support for Epstein's conclusion
that pharmaceutical marketing works to the benefit of patients,
although the effects are probably modest, as is the total volume of
advertising. 17
V. TORT LIABILITY
Epstein devotes the final section of his book to tort liability, one of his
specialties. He begins by deploring the eclipse of contracts as a way to
modify tort law. Much of the discussion focuses on the ongoing
litigation over Vioxx. Epstein sees serious problems with every aspect
of the typical plaintiff's case starting with simple facts (was Vioxx even
prescribed?) and proceeding through the details of clinical trials, FDA
proceedings, and much more including a strange but instructive episode
involving the renowned New England Journal of Medicine and its
public relations firm.
17 John E. Calfee, What Do We Know About Direct-To-Consumer Advertising Of
Prescription Drugs?, HEALTH AFFAIRS, 116, 119 (web exclusive) (last visited April
24, 2007); Ernst R. Berndt, The United States Experience with Direct-to-Consumer
Advertising of Prescription Drugs: What Have We Learned?; paper presented at the
International Conference on Pharmaceutical Innovation, Taipei, Taiwan, May 26-27,
2005. Forthcoming in FRANK A. SLOAN AND CHEE-RUEY HSIEH, PROMOTING AND
COPING WITH PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
(Cambridge University Press late 2006).
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Epstein concludes that the liability system is incapable of
efficiently handling either Vioxx litigation, in particular, or
pharmaceutical liability litigation in general. Juries, for example,
cannot reasonably decide fiendishly scientific issues. Damages'
payments, especially pain and suffering compensation and punitive
damages, will fatally distort the incentives of all parties including drug
development firms. He is especially opposed to liability for design
defects, which amounts to a second drug approval system built on top
of the official system run by the FDA. The result is to reinforce the
excessive caution already built into FDA deliberations.
Epstein therefore advocates reforms of the products liability
system. These include the restoration of contract (presumably a
hopeless cause), pre-emption of state tort law by FDA findings on the
balance of safety and efficacy and on risk disclosure, some sort of no-
fault compensation that would cap pain and suffering awards, and a
system of fines instead of litigation for genuinely reckless behavior by
pharmaceutical firms.
VI. THE BOOK AS A WHOLE
Epstein constructed his monograph around an immense intellectual
superstructure. This yields both advantages and disadvantages. One
disadvantage is that obviously important topics are raised but barely
touched despite a thriving academic literature on which to draw.
Examples include drug cost-effectiveness, the operations of price
controls (mainly in foreign nations), the development of clinical
biomarkers, and the redesign of clinical trials to facilitate drug
development and approvals in the wake of rapid technological change.
But the advantages of Epstein's ambitious approach are
considerable. Although one might expect the plenitude of topics
arising from the book's superstructure to prove hopelessly confusing,
the paradoxical effect is to facilitate understanding of why things work
the way they do and why it would be dangerous to make drastic
changes to patent law and laws about prices, to name two examples.
Yes, the interactions among so many thorny topics are too subtle and
complicated to delineate fully satisfactorily; but, they reflect the
obdurate nature of the system in which pharmaceutical development
takes place, and they serve as notice of both the dangers of precipitous
change and the potential gains from well-conceived reform. Thus some
of the most interesting and provocative chapters are not on FDA
regulation or torts, but on intellectual property, government buy-outs of
2007]
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pharmaceutical patents, and direct government drug development. All
these and more are addressed through subtle and illuminating economic
reasoning. As a whole, the book's arguments are cogent and
compelling. There is much to command the attention of anyone
concerned with public policy and the pharmaceutical industry.
